Cap Table Basics

Throughout the series of modeling posts, I’ll be using the example of Sweet Co. because Canaan, the venture firm where I am an analyst, likes investing in sweet companies.

The founders of Sweet Co. own shares in the company.  They decided to make things easy and start with 1,000,000 shares of Sweet Co.

At a certain point, Sweet Co. needs more money than the business generates on its own, so the founders decide to raise $500k of venture capital.  From an entrepreneurs’ perspective, the process of finding an investor is a combination of art, hard work and luck – and though it’s important – it’s already covered in various places on the internet.

Assuming the founders of Sweet Co. have found an interested VC, the first thing that the VC and Sweet Co. have to agree upon is the valuation of the company immediately before the VC makes an investment.  This valuation is called the pre-money valuation because it’s the value of the company immediately before the VC invests their money.

The reason that this is important is because the pre-money valuation has a direct effect on how much of the company the founders need to sell to get that $500k.  If the company’s value is set at $100mm, then the founders only need to sell a small part of the company (think less than 1%).  That’s good for the founders because they retain most of their ownership. On the flip side, if the value of the company is to be only $100k, then the founders will have to give up a large portion of the company (think 50%+).  Don’t worry, there is a sample workbook attached to this post that will allow you to see the math.

Surprisingly, determining the value of a seed deal (usually under $1mm) or Series A stage deal (usually $1-3mm) has less to do with determining value and more to do with structuring an appropriate amount of ownership dilution for the founders.  In this sense, valuation is less of a science and more of an art (though art that requires lots of math).

1.) As a rule of thumb, most early stage VC investors (including Canaan) want to own at about 20-30% of any company they invest in – which means the founders’ ownership will be diluted by 20-30%. (In reality, VC’s often don’t want to own a huge percentage of an early-stage startup because investors want the founders to be motivated by their equity stakes)

2.) Most of the time, entrepreneurs have a rough idea for the amount of money they need to raise – in our case it’s $500k.

With these two inputs, we can back solve a pre-money valuation that satisfies both the entrepreneur and the investor.  In the case of a $500k raise and a 25% ownership requirement by the VC, the pre-money needs to be $1.5mm – a fairly typical seed stage valuation for a company.

See the attached work book to understand how the math for all of this stuff works.  Try playing around with different raise amounts and different pre-money valuations.  You’ll quickly see why pre-money valuation is so often talked about by both investors and entrepreneurs.

intro
In my next post, I’ll tackle options.

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Series A and Beyond

The Series A

Now let’s assume that it’s 2 years later and Sweet Co. needs to raise more money. Let’s assume two scenarios:

1.)    Things are going great

2.)    Things aren’t going so great

Up Rounds

Let’s assume that things are going great with Sweet Co. and the company raises money at an “up round” valuation (VC translation: pre-money valuation of the upcoming round is higher than the post money valuation of the last round).  However, before the new investor puts in money, it wants the employees to “re-up” the options pool back to 10% post-money (meaning after they make the investment, the option pool is once again equal to 10% of the total number of shares).

Notice that the founders continue to get diluted.  They started with 100% ownership before receiving funding, then held 75% after the Seed Round, and only hold 31.5% after the A round. A lot of founders get hung up on dilution, but what they should care about is the value of the shares they own (vs. the % of the company they own).  Check out lines 31-33 in the model. The founder’s ownership decreased by 43.5% from the Seed to Series A, but the value of the shares the founders own actually went up by $860k!

Down Rounds (ouch)

Let’s assume now that things aren’t going so great and the company has to raise money at “down round” valuation (VC translation: the pre-money valuation of the upcoming round is lower than the post-money valuation of the previous round).

Down rounds are bad for two reasons:

1.)    They’re bad for existing investors because the value of each dollar invested in the previous round created less than $1 of value (which is bad). Conversely, each dollar that the new investor puts in, buys it more shares of the company than the existing investors got for the same amount of money invested.  That means that the existing investors and founders get diluted more than in an up round (not good).

2.)    But wait – it gets worse.  There is a widely used clause in VC term sheets that states that in down rounds, the previous round investor gets issued additional shares so that the effective price per share the previous round investor pays falls in between the new round price per share and the previous round price per share. The math behind that calculation is pretty complicated, so I’ll spare it from my model.  The important point is that down rounds can be painful.

Check out the attached workbook to play around with up round and down round scenarios.


initial investment

Next week, I’ll tackle returns modeling!

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